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Michael Galchinsky, “Quaint and Obsolete:  The ‘War on Terror’ and the Right to Legal 
Personality” 
 
1.  The Post-9/11 Crisis in International Law 
The Bush administration’s “war on terror” did not cause consternation in the 
international law community; it caused outrage and panic.  The “war on terror” was 
understood to be, among other things, an attack on international law—specifically, on 
international human rights law (IHRL) and the law of armed conflict (also known as 
international humanitarian law, or IHL).  International law supporters responded to the 
US administration’s attack by behaving as though the foundations of the global legal 
order had to be rearticulated and reinforced.   
Do suspected global terrorists have rights?  In debating this question in the post-
9/11 period, lawmakers, judges, and activists began to reconsider fundamental questions, 
such as the degree to which human rights may be restricted or suspended in armed 
conflicts and states of emergency, and whether the boundary between “civilians” and 
“combatants” is clear.  While the objects of all this activity have been a relatively small 
group of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Bagram Air Base, its successor at Parwan, and 
the ghost prisons, the result has been nothing less than a reevaluation of the grounds on 
which hopes for global security and rights rest.
1
  How have proponents of IHL and IHRL 
responded to this challenge? 
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This debate on first principles has encompassed many rights, but the right of 
everyone to recognition everywhere as a person before the law lies at the heart of them 
all.  To be recognized as a person before the law means, among other things, to have 
standing to exercise one’s rights.  That the right applies to “everyone” means that there 
can be no derogation based on contingent factors such as nationality, race, religion, or 
sex.  That the right applies “everywhere” suggests universal coverage across territorially-
bounded jurisdictions.  In any governance system dedicated to the rule of law, the right to 
be recognized as a legal person is indispensable.  For this reason the right, which is 
declared in Art. 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and codified in Art. 16 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is regarded as a peremptory 
norm of customary international law that may not be suspended under any 
circumstances.
2
  The derogation clause in the International Covenant for Civil and 
Political Rights (Art. 4(2)) specifically prohibits the restriction or suspension of the right 
to recognition for any reason.  The right’s very breadth makes it symbolically appropriate 
to the charged atmosphere after September 11, since which the objects of debate have not 
just been the legitimacy of this or that right, but of international right itself. 
 
The Development of the Right to Recognition 
                                                                                                                                                 
1
 In the United States context, see Justice John Paul Stevens decision in Padilla v. 
Rumsfeld 124 S. Ct. 2711, 159 L. Ed. 2d 513 (2004) that “At stake in this case is nothing 
less than the essence of a free society,” qtd. in Richard Ashby Wilson, ed., Human Rights 
in the ‘War on Terror’ (Cambridge UP, 2005), 22. 
2
 Nijman, supra.   
 3 
The right to recognition, also known as the right to legal personality, would seem 
like the natural starting-place for the debate over whether a suspected terrorist has legal 
standing in international law.  While one finds debates about the suspects’ standing in the 
national jurisprudence of many countries, however, one looks in vain in the post-9/11 
jurisprudence produced by international courts and treaty bodies for an explicit analysis 
of the relevance of this right to 9/11 suspects.  The absence is likely due to the history of 
the right’s usage in earlier decisions, where it had typically been cited in reference to 
questions far removed from the context of terrorism.   
The concept of legal personality was developed in the seventeenth century by 
Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes.  It emerged in order to give “personhood” status to 
organized groups—which entailed bequeathing upon the legal person will and agency, 
manifested in the legal person’s ability to make contracts, own property, sue in court—to 
exercise civil rights as if it were an individual.  In the Westphalian model, the preeminent 
legal person was the state.
3
  Over the course of the nineteenth century, the corporation 
was granted full personhood status; in the twentieth, the non-governmental organization 
were granted elements of that status as well. 
While the organizational model gained force, however, the definition of legal 
personality began to take a new turn at the start of the twentieth century—from the 
organizational person toward the individual person.  During the establishment of the 
League of Nations, the legal person, for purposes of international jurisprudence, began to 
be identified with the individual human person.  The legislative history of the right’s 
                                                 
3
 Janne Elisabeth Nijman, The Concept of International Legal Personality (Hague:  T. M. 
C. Asser Press, 2004).  
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incorporation into the UDHR shows that the drafters linked legal personality to civil 
rights (except in the case of age, mental condition, or felony conviction), specifically the 
capacity to marry, own property, make contracts, and work.
4
  Bodies like the Human 
Rights Committee monitoring the ICCPR have usually referred to this right in discussions 
of persons belonging to groups historically denied legal standing:  slaves, women, 
apartheid victims, stateless individuals, aliens, homosexuals, minorities, and children.5  
Odd as it seems, the Bush administration placed terrorist suspects in this group by 
asserting that, as Helen Duffy put it, “some…persons are so ‘evil’ or dangerous that they 
are rendered beyond the protection of law.”6   
The post-9/11 jurisprudence in international bodies has responded to the US 
attack on the right to recognition by spelling out four general principles it considers 
immanent within IHRL and IHL.  These principles are:  1) complementarity, that, with 
some caveats, human rights and humanitarian law are both compatible and compulsory in 
conflict situations; 2) maximal extension, that where there is doubt about the 
                                                 
4
 See, e.g., Commission on Human Rights Drafting Committee on an International Bill of 
Human Rights, First Session, Report of the drafting committee to the Commission on 
Human Rights, E/Cn.4/21 1 July 1947; Commission on Human Rights Drafting 
Committee, International Bill of Rights, Documented Outline, Part I--Texts, 
E/CN.4/AC.l/3/Add.l. 
5   Joseph Wronka, Human Rights and Social Policy in the 21
st
 Century, rev. ed. (UP of 
America, 1998), 100; Human Rights Watch World Report 2008 (Seven Stories Press, 
2008), 38. 
6   Duffy, supra, 449. 
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applicability of humanitarian or human rights provisions, those provisions must be 
extended to those whose status is doubtful; 3) restricted derogation, that during threats 
to the life of a nation, which permit states to restrict or suspend certain human rights, 
derogability is limited to specific rights, and even then the freedom to derogate must 
conform to strict protocols regulated by law; and 4) regulated detention, that detention 
of suspected terrorists must comply with the prescriptions of both human rights and 
humanitarian law.  The right of everyone to recognition everywhere as a person before 
the law is a useful staging ground from which to examine how these four principles have 
begun to be applied. 
The right to recognition becomes significant after 9/11 in the context of three 
distinct theories regarding the rights of terrorist suspects.   Here, “theory” refers to a 
consistent approach to legal argument and policy-making on the basis of a set of 
explicitly articulated principles.  The Bush administration’s theory—what its critics have 
dubbed the “legal black hole” theory—suggests that suspected terrorists of global reach 
are not addressed by current international law, necessitating the creation of new law that 
offer substantially fewer protections for such suspects.  The black hole theory has been 
answered by two alternatives that could be called the “full coverage” and “evolutionary” 
theories.  The full coverage theory argues that suspected terrorists do find a place in both 
IHL and IHRL, which in their current form adequately address the challenge al Qaeda 
suspects represent.  The evolutionary theory seeks a middle ground, recognizing facets of 
global terrorism that are beyond the reach of current law, but seeking principles from 
within the law with which to extend it. 
 
 6 
Legal Black Hole 
 According to a variety of Bush-era officials—Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, Justice and Defense Department attorneys 
Jay Bybee and William Haynes II, White House Counsel John Yoo, and President Bush 
himself—terrorists of global reach like members of al Qaeda had no status as legal 
persons under any international treaty.  The administration maintained that detainees 
suspected of global terrorism could not be considered lawful combatants or civilians 
within the meaning of IHL, nor could they be protected by IHRL.  Finally the 
administration argued that the US was not bound to treat terrorist suspects according to 
the strictures of customary international law—that body of law constituted by the general 
behavior of states.  The Bush administration was not monolithic and there were intense 
internal debates about the legality of its approach throughout the presidency, with 
dissents by, among others, Secretary of State Colin Powell, General Counsel of the Navy 
Alberto Mora, and Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel Jack Goldsmith, but 
their voices did not prevail, and the administration’s behavior was generally dictated by 
the theory that terrorist suspects were not legal persons.
7
 
 On the black hole theory, terrorist suspects cannot be classed as combatants, 
either in international or internal armed conflicts.  Because IHL defines international 
conflicts as hostilities between states, suspected terrorists, who are members of a private 
group rather than soldiers, cannot be parties to such a conflict.8  Nor can they be classed 
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 Jack Goldsmith gives an account of the internal debates in The Terror Presidency (W. 
W. Norton, 2007). 
8  Common Art. 2 of the Geneva Conventions. 
 7 
as combatants in an internal armed conflict because they do not fulfill requirements set 
out in Geneva Convention III relative to the prisoners of war (1949) and their additional 
Protocols (1977) for such conflicts—including, for example, controlling a single territory, 
wearing insignia, observing IHL, and being organized in a central command structure.
9
  
Because they do not fall into the categories currently prescribed by IHL, the Bush 
administration decided that they were not due the prisoner of war protections guaranteed 
to combatants.  These protections include the right to challenge their detention in a 
regularly constituted court, as specified by common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.
10
   
 Denial of POW status thus risked denial of the right to recognition, and in fact 
many suspects remained in detention for years without being charged or tried.  Only 
when the Supreme Court ruled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) that Guantanamo detainees 
were entitled to habeas corpus hearings did Congress pass the Military Commissions Act 
setting up the military tribunals system.  Fierce debates raged as to the extent to which 
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 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Art. 
4(2); 1977 Geneva Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Art. 1; 
James A. Schoettler, Jr., “Detention of Combatants and the Global War on Terror,” in 
Michael W. Lewis, ed., The War on Terror and the Laws of War:  A Military Perspective 
(Oxford UP, 2009), 77. 
10
 The United States Supreme Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (No. 05-184), June 29, 
2006, 415 F. 3d 33; Matthew Evangelista, Law, Ethics, and the War on Terror (Polity, 
2008). 
 8 
this system constituted adequate access to justice.  International human rights 
organizations accused the tribunals of being kangaroo courts that violated the detainees’ 
rights to be protected from coercive interrogation, be presumed innocent, have full access 
to evidence and counsel, be informed of the charges and evidence against them, face an 
independent and impartial judge, and appeal adverse rulings. 
 While the Bush administration did not find al Qaeda fighters to be combatants, 
neither did it find them to be “civilians.”  As civilians, terrorist suspects could be tried for 
crimes in a domestic or international criminal court, but the Bush administration declared 
that apprehended al Qaeda members could not be considered civilians because they had 
engaged in armed conflict, albeit not of a type that falls within the competence of current 
IHL.  Hence, while not combatants, they could not be protected under the fourth Geneva 
Convention guiding the treatment of civilians, either. 
Alberto Gonzales pithily summarized the administration’s position on the 
inapplicability of IHL in his January 25, 2002 memo to President Bush declaring that 
“the war against terrorism is a new kind of war.  It is not the traditional clash between 
nations adhering to the laws of war….  In my judgment, this new paradigm renders 
obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on the questioning of enemy prisoners and renders 
quaint some of its provisions….”11 
The administration contended that international human rights law (IHRL) was as 
inapplicable as IHL.  It asserted, first, that human rights law was meant for peacetime, 
                                                 
11
 Michael Ratner, The Trial of Donald Rumsfeld (The New Press, 2008); Marco Sassòli, 
“Query:  Is There a Status of ‘Unlawful Combatant?’,” Int’l L. Stud. Ser. US Naval War 
Col. (2006):  57-68. 
 9 
not armed conflict or states of emergency, but the “war on terror” was, if not an armed 
conflict, then at least a state of emergency.
12
  Second, it argued that a state is bound to 
apply IHRL only within its own territory or the territory it occupies, and then only 
selectively.  It would not extend to the Qaeda detainees, who were being held at locations 
outside of the geographical boundaries of the United States, nor would it extend to Qaeda 
operatives who had voluntarily chosen to enter a US-occupied territory such as 
Afghanistan.
13
  Third, it asserted that the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
rights, which the US ratified in 1992, could not hold sway in US courts unless it was 
incorporated into domestic law through special legislation.  In language the US has used 
since the 1950s to avoid enforcing human rights treaties, the Covenant was non-self-
executing.
14
  Fourth, unlike the UK, the Bush administration did not formally derogate 
from the Covenant; rather, it simply asserted that the treaty, which the US ratified in 
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 President Bush formally issued a proclamation declaring a national state of emergency 
on Sept. 14, 2001 in Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist 
Attacks, Federal Register 66.181 (September 18, 2001):  48199.  The state of emergency 
has been extended repeatedly. 
13
 Schoettler, supra, 85. 
14
 United Nations Treaty Collection, ICCPR Declarations and Reservations, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec, Declaration (1).  But note that this Declaration conflicts 
with the US Supreme Court’s decision in Paquete Habana.; The Lola, 175 U.S. 677 
(1900) which integrated the Law of Nations with US law. 
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1992, was non-binding under the circumstances.
 15
  Fifth, it asserted that under post-9/11 
immigration law, it had the power to detain suspects who were not US citizens 
indefinitely.
16
 
Along with IHL and IHRL, the administration also rejected customary 
international law on the grounds that it was not really law but at best policy or moral 
aspiration.   Legal theorists the administration found congenial include Jack Goldsmith 
(who later dissented from Bush hard-liners like John Yoo), and Eric A. Posner, a 
University of Chicago Law Professor.  Goldsmith and Posner argued that customary 
international law is not actually a record of state custom, but a set of claims jurists have 
made based on evidence they have gathered from the language of treaties, resolutions, 
and scholarly writings, leavened with a heavy dose of moral argument.
17
  Because it is 
not really what it claims to be, customary law does not have the authority its supporters 
claim.  Even jus cogens norms—that core of customary rights long considered in force 
regardless of the circumstances—could not tie the administration’s hands. 
If IHL, IHRL, and customary law were inapplicable to the detainees’ case, then, 
the administration said, it was bound to construct a “law-of-war paradigm” designed to 
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 United Nations Treaty Collection, ICCPR Declarations and Reservations, supra. 
16
 Daniel Moeckli, Human Rights Non-discrimination in the ‘War on Terror’ (Oxford 
UP, 2008), 114-115. 
17
 Jack Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford UP, 
2005), 132ff. 
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meet the new challenges.
18
   The new paradigm would certainly conflict with the old law, 
because the latter did not foresee global terrorism.  In other words, if a) the Qaeda 
detainees’ human rights could be restricted or suspended during a states of emergency, b) 
human rights law and customary international law were inapplicable to their case, and c) 
their position was not addressed by the current laws of armed conflict, then a new law of 
armed conflict would have to be constructed, one based on traditional humanitarian law 
principles (however and by whomever defined) but tailored for a new era.   
In one respect, the Bush administration’s attempt to keep security and human 
rights issues separate coincides with how the United Nations has historically structured 
the relationship between them, with military questions located in the Security Council 
and human rights questions in various Charter and treaty bodies.    The institutional 
structure reflects the notion that war is governed by one set of laws and procedures, peace 
by another.  A month after 9/11, when the Security Council passed Res. 1373 creating its 
Committee on Counter-Terrorism, the resolution reinforced this separation:  it mandated 
that states cooperate with each other in the fight against terrorism but, in typical fashion, 
made only one vague mention of human rights having to do with asylum.  By 2003, 
however, in reaction against the US position, Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the 
General Assembly, among others, began to pressure the Counter-Terrorism Committee to 
acknowledge that security and human rights are “mutually reinforcing.”  From that point, 
the CTC worked increasingly with the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the 
Human Rights Council and the Special Rapporteur for the promotion and protection of 
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 David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey, “The Laws of War Have Served us Well,” Wall 
Street Journal, WJS.com Forums, Jan. 26, 2009. 
 12 
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.
 19
  CTC and its 
administrative arm, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), 
worked to ensure that IHL and IHRL would be taken into account at every stage of the 
UN’s work on counter-terrorism.20  CTED hired a Senior Human Rights Officer, Edward 
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 “Secretary-General Kofi Annan Launches Global Strategy against Terrorism in 
Madrid:  Agreement on Terrorism Convention, Respect for Human Rights, and 
Strengthening State Capacity to Prevent Terrorist Acts Are Key Elements of Strategy,” 
UNIS/INF/64, 10 March 2005; “Policy Guidance regarding Human Rights and the CTC,” 
S/AC.40/2006/PG2 (25 May 2006); Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
“Human Rights, Terrorism, and Counter-terrorism Fact Sheet No. 32,” July, 2008, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet32EN.pdf; “Report of the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee to the Security Council for its consideration as part of its 
interim review of the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate” 
S/2009/289 (4 June 2009); CTED, “Thematic Discussion on Human Rights and 
Resolution 1373,” 7 Oct. 2010, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2010/2010_10_07_humanrights.ppt; Report of the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee to the Security Council for its comprehensive 
consideration of the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, 
S/2010/616. 
20   Duffy, supra, 359, 373-74; Report of the Human Rights Council, Supplement No. 53 
(A/63/53), 2007, 6/4, 7/7; A/HRC/2/9; SC res. 1456 (2003); Counter-Terrorism 
Committee, Chair’s briefing to Security Council, Jan. 18, 2002; Security Council res. 
1535 (2004), S/2004/124, S/2005/800; S/2006/989; SS Res. 1624 (2005); SC res. 1805 
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Flynn, to ensure visibility, and instituted a set of routine and recursive procedures, 
through its Preliminary Implementation Assessment, to monitor each state’s compliance, 
carry out country visits, provide technical assistance, and engage in dialogue with states 
about the extent to which their counter-terrorism measures complied with IHL and 
IHRL.
21
  Ironically, although human rights are still the poor stepchild in the CTC, the 
backlash against the “war on terror” has produced closer ties between the UN’s security 
and human rights apparatuses, which has appreciably strengthened monitoring of states’ 
compliance.  In reaction to the “war on terror,” the Security Council has become, for the 
first time in its history, a human rights organization.
22
 
 
Full Coverage 
International law supporters who opposed the legal black hole theory produced an 
alternative that could be called the “full coverage” theory, which asserts that IHL and 
IHRL do provide guidelines (i.e., the principles of complementarity, maximal extension, 
restricted derogation, and regulated detention outlined above) that, together, enable an 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2008); Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, “Human Rights,” 
http.//www.un.org/sc/ctc/rights.html. 
21
 See, e.g., E.J. Flynn, “The Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee and 
Human Rights,” Human Rights Law Review 7.2 (2007):  371-384.   
22
 I expanded on these developments in a paper titled, “Countering Jack Bauer:  How the 
War on Terror Strengthened Human Rights,” available in the ISA archives for the 2011 
conference.  The fully fleshed-out version of the argument is scheduled to appear in 2012 
as “A Sea Change in Security,” in the Journal of Conflict Studies. 
 14 
adequate response to the legal challenges presented by global terrorism.  The full 
coverage theory takes the principle of complementarity as its starting.  That principle was 
summed up by the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights in its 2003 “Digest 
of Jurisprudence of the UN and Regional Organizations on the Protection of Human 
Rights While Countering Terrorism.”   It said that IHR and IHRL “may complement” one 
another because they share a “common nucleus of non-derogable rights and common 
purpose of promoting human life and dignity.”23   
Here, complementarity does not mean that the two legal regimes are exactly the 
same.  While a given right must be respected during armed conflict, the test for 
evaluating its observance “may be distinct from that applicable in time of peace.”24  
Hence, IHL is more flexible than IHRL regarding how certain rights are observed.  
Second, during hostilities, IHL will take precedence over IHRL if their provisions are in 
conflict, because IHL is the more specifically relevant law—the lex specialis.25  Yet 
rights restrictions during armed conflict must conform to the prescriptions of the 
Covenant’s derogation clause (Art. 4(2)) or the more specific laws of IHL.  Derogation 
from a right in the Covenant does not invalidate a parallel right in IHL.  For example, 
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 “Digest,” supra, 16.  Cf. the different meaning of “complementarity” in the 
International Criminal Court, Rome Statute, A/CONF.183/9 (17 July 1998), Art. 17. 
24   “Digest,” supra, 16; also Duffy, supra, 290. 
25
 “Digest,” supra, 16-17; International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the 
construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 
2004, para. 106 and fn. 123. 
 15 
derogating from fair trial rights in IHRL does not invalidate fair trial rights guaranteed by 
an IHL treaty, even when they are phrased in exactly the same language. 
For this theory, the fact that there is no international agreement on the meaning of 
the term “terrorism”26 and that no terrorism convention has been adopted does not 
prevent IHL and IHRL from addressing acts associated with terrorism under most 
definitions, because such acts have long been prohibited through more specific 
instruments.
27
   
The full coverage theory has been advanced by all of the relevant international 
judicial bodies, as well as by international law publicists, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, the International Law Commission, and human rights NGOs.  As regards 
IHL, these authorities have argued that the “war on terror” is not technically a war at all.  
Still, they have maintained, even if it is a war, terrorists do not fall into a limbo between 
combatant and civilian status.  The definitive commentary on Geneva Convention IV by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross holds that there is a “general principle 
which is embodied in all four Geneva Conventions of 1949” that every person detained 
during armed conflict is either a combatant or a civilian:  “There is no intermediate 
                                                 
26
 Thomas Weigend, “The Universal Terrorist:  The International Community Grappling 
with a Definition,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 4 (2006):  912-932. 
27
 For a list of the fourteen terrorism-related multilateral treaties, see 
www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml. 
 
 16 
status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law.28  Here there is an implicit appeal 
to the right to recognition. 
For this reason, the trend in IHL since 1949 has been toward maximal extension 
of the law to cover doubtful cases.  The third Geneva Convention relative to prisoners of 
war, Art. 5, extends combatant status to doubtful cases pending a judicial determination 
of their status.  What Geneva III does for doubtful cases of combatancy, Protocol I of 
1977 does for determination of civilian status, asserting that “In case of doubt whether a 
person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.”29  It is not a 
theoretical question of whether everyone can be covered by the law—IHL assumes 
everyone can—but a practical question requiring case by case determination.   
Maximal extension specifically applies to fair trial rights during states of 
emergency, even if, like the state of emergency that existed in the US after the 9/11 
attacks, the type of emergency has not been foreseen in IHL.  In the Human Rights 
Committee’s General Comment No. 29 on States of Emergency, the Committee asserted 
that 
                                                 
28   ICRC, “Commentary on Geneva Convention IV relative to the protection of civilians 
in time of war, 12 Aug. 1949,” para. 4, http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/COM/380-
600007?OpenDocument. 
29  Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Art. 50(1).  
 17 
As certain elements of the right to a fair trial are explicitly guaranteed under IHL 
during armed conflict, the Committee finds no justification for derogation from 
these guarantees during other emergency situations.
30
 
In a similar way, international courts have ruled that, if the definition of dissident armed 
groups in current IHL is too restrictive to cover terrorism, IHL needs to be extended to 
include even such extraordinary cases.
31
  For example, the Appeals chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia found in the Tadić and Delalić 
cases that international humanitarian law’s primary object is to protect civilians “to the 
maximum extent possible.”32  In other words, every captive is a person before the law.   
The black hole and full coverage theories agree that IHL does not apply to 
everyone in its current form.  The difference is that the full coverage theory seeks to 
uncover the law’s inner logic, to reveal the principles inherent to it, in order to extend the 
law, as it were, from within.  By contrast, the black hole theory seeks to narrow the law’s 
                                                 
30
 General Comment No. 29, supra, para 16; also paras. 11, 13.  For IHL rules on fair trial 
rights, see 1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
Articles 84, 99-108, and Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions. 
31
 Cf. Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov, “International Humanitarian Law and Non-State 
Actors, “ Soc’y Int’l L. Proc (2008) 441-444. 
32
 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment of Appeals Chamber, July 
15, 1999, para. 168; ICTY Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment of 
Appeals Chamber, Feb. 20, 2001, para. 73. 
 18 
scope to the vanishing point.
33
  For the Bush administration, the evident end of this 
approach was to weaken the normative claims of law in order to consolidate power in the 
Executive.  One could see an example of this trend in a March, 2009 Justice Department 
memorandum to the US District Court of the District of Columbia regarding the habeas 
corpus claims of Guantanamo detainees:  “The President has the authority to detain 
persons the President determines planned, authorized, committed or aided terrorist attacks 
on September 11….”34  There is no mention of legislative or judicial review of the 
president’s determination.  The memorandum adopts this language from the 
congressional Authorization to Use Military Force (2001) enacted immediately after 
9/11, which under the declaration of a national state of emergency gave President Bush 
sweeping powers. 
In addition to defending IHL’s adequacy to global terrorism, full coverage theory 
defends the relevance and jurisdiction of IHRL.  The US claim that the Covenant was 
non-self-executing was thought by many experts to show “contempt for the international 
legal process.”35  The Human Rights Committee resoundingly rejected the view that the 
                                                 
33
 Derek Gregory uses the term “vanishing point” in a geographical sense to analyze the 
way Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay “direct the politico- legal gaze through an 
extended series of vanishing points towards ‘non-places’ for ‘non-people’.”  See 
“Vanishing points:  Law, Violence and Exception in the Global War Prison, in Derek 
Gregory and Allan Pred, eds., Violent Geographies: Fear, Terror and Political Violence 
(New York: Routledge,2006). 
34
 Qtd. in Schoettler, supra, 80. 
35  Duffy, supra, 347. 
 19 
Covenant fails to govern a state’s human rights behavior outside of its own territory.  In 
its 2003 Concluding Observations to Israel’s periodic country report, the Committee 
asserted that a state’s extraterritorial practice “does not preclude the application of the 
Covenant, including article 4 which covers situations of public emergency.”36  The full 
coverage theory rejects the black hole theory’s assertion that when a state fights terrorism 
it is entitled to pick and choose which humanitarian law principles it will abide by.  If a 
state seeks to rely on the law of armed conflict, it must swallow IHL whole.
37
   
For proponents of the full coverage theory, the main challenge is not to develop 
new laws but to enforce existing laws.  For example, Geoffrey Robertson, a British law 
professor, litigator, and Appeals Judge for the war crimes court in Sierra Leone, has 
argued that any reforms that need to be made are not to the law but to the “delivery 
systems;” hence, he has criticized the new international courts as slow, expensive, 
inefficient, corrupt, and prone to giving grandstanding defendants airtime.38  
In sum, the full coverage theory maintains that whatever challenges global 
terrorism poses to IHL and IHRL can be met with complementarity, maximal extension, 
and restricted derogation, in an atmosphere of strengthened enforcement mechanisms. 
 
Evolution 
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Between these two poles an intermediate argument has emerged that could be 
called the “evolutionary” theory, which, while denying that terrorist suspects fall into a 
legal black hole, recognizes that some areas of IHL and IHRL may need to be elaborated 
to address the unprecedented circumstances.  Mary Robinson, former High 
Commissioner of Human Rights, agrees with the Bush administration that global 
terrorism has challenged the international community in “new ways,” but while the 
administration’s reaction was to dispense with rights in favor of security, Robinson’s is to 
protect IHRL because, like national security, it was “also the object of terrorist attacks.”39   
On this view, while the Bush administration fundamentally and deliberately 
misused and ignored IHL and IHRL, it nevertheless was partially correct in its diagnosis 
of their incapacity to address current problems.  An armed conflict between a state and 
non-state actor based in multiple states, capable of causing widespread harm to civilians, 
and intent on sowing terror through the sophisticated use of mass media was 
unprecedented, and unanticipated by IHL.
40
  However, for evolutionists, the proper 
response is not to discard the law, but to grow it. 
In response, the evolutionary theory has identified 3 areas where legal innovation 
may be needed or should be feared.  First, some have suggested that states should 
relinquish part of its sovereignty so that in cases where a state refuses to police terrorists 
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in its midst, a more robust police power can be vested in an international organization.  In 
the introduction to his collection, Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror,’ Richard Ashby 
Wilson explains how state sovereignty has impeded international criminal justice from 
dealing with cases of terrorism.  He argues that 
the new anti-terror doctrine responds to real security threats which existing 
international institutions were not originally designed to deal with….  The 
1990s system of international criminal justice was not constructed with 
international terrorism in mind….  The I[nternational] C[riminal] C[ourt] 
relies (e.g., for powers of search, seizure, and arrest) on a state sovereignty 
model that seems outmoded when faced with global Islamist terrorist 
networks.
41
   
Wilson’s observation goes to the heart of the Westphalian model of sovereignty, and even 
apart from the terrorist threat one could imagine a role for a supranational police force in 
cases of international criminal justice.  The weakness of the current system was evident 
when in 2009 and 2010 the International Criminal Court issued two warrants for the 
arrest of President Omar Bashir of Sudan in connection with the Darfur genocide.  The 
Sudanese authorities refused to hand him over to the court, as did neighboring countries 
he visited (Chad and Kenya), starkly the revealing the limits of international justice in the 
context of state sovereignty.  While there is no chance that a global police form will 
emerge any time soon, the value of the evolutionist position is that it points out areas 
where global terrorism has exposed gaps in existing law. 
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  Second, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction has been invoked to argue that 
European courts may try officials in the Bush administration for violating IHL or IHRL.  
Universal jurisdiction empowers a national court or international tribunal to try a citizen 
of a state for serious crimes such as genocide and war crimes, even though the 
prosecuting state or tribunal has no historical connection to the events.  This doctrine 
existed well before 9/11, and was gaining acceptance during the 1990s when many new 
experiments in international criminal justice were emerging, including the tribunals for 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the ICC.
42
  The doctrine was invoked, for 
example, in the 1998 decision by the Law Lords of the British Parliament to permit the 
extradition of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet to Spain for prosecution for crimes in 
which neither Spain nor the United Kingdom had any direct national interest.
43
  Debates 
over whether it is permissible to try Donald Rumsfeld or Dick Cheney in a European 
venue turn on the legality of universal jurisdiction.  Like the proposal for a global 
policing organization, this universal jurisdiction doctrine has met many obstacles, but 
again it is useful in pointing out the need to supplement existing law. 
 Not all responses to gaps in the law are positive, from evolutionists’ perspective.  
The change they most fear is the change in customary international law that might take 
place if too many states follow the US lead and pass “exception laws.”  These laws 
restrict or suspend IHRL for detainees they classify as terrorists, who in practice are often 
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merely their political opponents or disfavored minorities.44  Indeed, numerous states 
passed just such laws during the decade following 9/11.  Richard Goldstone and others 
have documented that the UK, India, Russia, the Phillipines, Thailand, South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Liberia and Indonesia, amother others, cited US behavior as precedent for 
exception laws restricting or suspending IHRL for detainees.
45
  The worry is that each 
exception law risks contributing to the establishment of new, more permissive, customary 
law.  As Richard Goldstone put it, “What is of particular concern is that this violation of 
international law…might well weaken the Geneva Conventions and be used to justify 
similar violations by other countries.”46   
 Goldsmith and Posner concur with Goldstone on the possibility that US behavior 
might change customary law, but seem less unnerved by the prospect.  They suggest that 
every state action inconsistent with existing international law “might be said to be a 
proposal for revision of existing international law.” 47  For them, the fact that 
international law changes when states change their behavior means that “we cannot 
condemn a state merely for violating international law.  The question is whether by 
violating international law a state is likely to change international law from a moral 
perspective.  This is why so much international legal argument seems indistinguishable 
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from moral argument.”48  From this point of view, the Bush exception laws may well 
have contributed to the establishment of new, less restrictive state customs with regard to 
counter-terrorism, but the value of that change will depend on a retrospective moral 
judgment by an unspecified observer, according to unstated moral assumptions.  This 
pragmatic take on change sees international law less as a codification of shared norms 
than as an instrument of power.  For Goldstone and other evolutionists, however, it is 
precisely the consolidation of power in the Executive that post-9/11 international 
jurisprudence sought to curtail.  The evolutionist would object that when violations come 
to be seen merely as proposals, when the exception is no longer regarded as exceptional, 
the rule of law becomes meaningless.   
 While evolutionary theory recognizes that international jurisprudence must, in 
some cases, develop new law, it argues that any new law must be developed according to 
the general principles that organize existing IHL and IHRL, and insists that the existing 
law will generally suffice to meet the challenges posed by global terrorism.   
   
The Right to Recognition After 9/11 
The attempt to strip terrorist suspects of legal personality became evident in the 
Bush administration’s denial of fair trial rights, in particular the right of habeas corpus.  
In the Presidential Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, the administration declined to grant 
terrorist suspects the right to judicial review of their detention, and when the Supreme 
Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) overturned the suspension of habeas corpus for 
Guantanamo detainees, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act (2006), denying 
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habeas to “unlawful enemy combatants,” a designation found nowhere in IHL but applied 
at the discretion of the Executive.   
As the restriction of habeas corpus makes clear, legal personality is associated 
with a cluster of other rights, which it makes necessary, and without which it cannot be 
observed.  These include non-derogable rights listed in the Covenant like the right to life, 
prohibition of torture and slavery, and prohibition of retroactive criminalization.49  Other 
rights associated with legal personality are immune to derogation due to their status as jus 
cogens norms—for example, equality before the law and some fair trial rights.50  Even 
legitimate derogations must be limited to strictly necessary, proportionate, and temporary 
measures that are subject to regular judicial review.51  For example, the Covenant’s 
derogation clause cannot justify prolonged or incommunicado detention in any 
circumstances, because such a violation would deprive the detainee of legal 
personality.52 
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International jurisprudence, resisting the black hole theory, has insisted that the 
rights associated with legal personality are too fundamental to be compromised, even for 
the sake of countering terrorism.  Moreover, numerous bodies have found the right in 
both IHL and IHRL, which has prompted them to propose that the principle of 
complementarity between the two legal regimes is relevant to the conflict with global 
terrorism.  As the Counter-Terrorism Committee has repeatedly asserted since 2005, “any 
measure taken to combat terrorism should…adopt such measures in accordance 
with…human rights law…and humanitarian law.”53  Regional bodies including the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have 
agreed.
54
  
 Even where rights may be restricted during armed conflict, their restriction is 
constrained by IHL and IHRL, due to the principle of limited derogability.  Contrary to 
the Bush administration’s suspension of non-derogable and peremptory rights like the 
right to legal personality, international jurisprudence since 9/11 has indicated that even 
when there is a “threat to the life of a nation,” there are seven considerations that limit 
derogability, including the principle that derogated rights must always be under judicial 
control, which assumes that an individual detained on suspicion of terrorism must have 
legal standing.
55
 
While some rights may be restricted during armed conflict and other states of 
emergency, as prescribed by IHL and IHRL, even they may not be restricted in such a 
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way as to violate the right to legal personality.
56
  The Human Rights Committee has 
asserted that the Covenant’s derogation clause cannot justify violating fair trial rights, in 
particular the presumption of innocence, even though fair trial rights are among those that 
do not appear in the derogation clause.
57
  This is because fair trial rights are considered 
peremptory norms of customary international law, and thus do not need to be codified as 
non-derogable in treaty law. 
An important example of a derogable right, the derogation from which is 
illegitimate because it would invalidate legal personality, is the prohibition of arbitrary 
and prolonged detention.  By 1998, the Human Rights Committee had already determined 
that, although the prohibition of arbitrary and prolonged detention does not appear in the 
derogation clause, such detention is nonetheless “incompatible” with the Article 16 right 
to legal personality, the latter of which is non-derogable.
58
  Legal personality is violated 
when detention is unregulated because then the detainee is at the mercy of his jailers.  To 
be lawful, the detention must not be arbitrary, it must be subject to judicial control, the 
detainee must have the right to challenge the detention in an independent and impartial 
court, the detainee must be informed of the charges against him, the detention must be 
temporary so as not to violate the presumption of innocence, and incommunicado 
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detention (in which the detainee is not permitted contact with counsel, the ICRC, or 
family) is prohibited.
59
  As with restricted derogation, the philosophical basis for these 
regulations is that they protect the detainee’s fundamental right to be recognized as a 
person before the law. 
 
4.  Evolution in the United States 
 The Obama administration has not rushed to reinstate legal personality for 
detained terrorist suspects.  Once in office Obama resisted moving some detainees into 
the criminal justice system, citing state secrets concerns familiar from the Bush 
administration.  A month after his term began, on February 20, 2009, the administration 
filed a brief in federal court arguing that detainees at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan 
had no habeas rights.60  While arguing that suspected terrorists should be tried in 
criminal court rather than military tribunals, the Attorney General Eric Holder 
nonetheless maintained that standard Miranda rules for interrogation should be loosened 
to be “more consistent with the threat we now face.”61   
The administration has since made some movements toward respecting IHL and 
IHRL.  In 2008, President Obama affirmed in an Executive Order that detainees at 
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Guantanamo have the right to challenge their detentions in court.62  In April, 2009 it 
began granting some Bagram detainees habeas rights by setting up review boards 
enabling prisoners to challenge their detention.63  Once the review boards began to 
function, the administration transferred some of the detainees to the authority of local 
elders, while freeing others no longer thought to be a threat.  So far the administration has 
released the names of over 600 of the detainees.64   
But in 2010, the Obama administration was still resisting granting some high 
value Bagram detainees habeas rights, on the grounds that, unlike the Guantanamo 
prisoners, they were captured on the sovereign territory of another state in an active 
theater of war.65  However, in Boumediene vs. Bush (2008), the Supreme Court had 
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denied this claim.
66
  Nonetheless, the administration continued to behave as if the right to 
legal personality were derogable rather than a norm that is both non-derogable and jus 
cogens.  As of Jan. 31, 2011, only one Guantanamo detainee, Ahmed Ghailani, was tried 
in US domestic court, and the Obama administration subsequently set up new military 
tribunals at Guantanamo for high-value detainees.
67
 
The Obama administration’s approach indicates that when it comes to countering 
terrorism states will proceed with caution regardless of their leaders’ political leanings.  If 
the US sets the tone for international custom in the coming decade, what we are likely to 
see is a general shift from the black hole to the evolutionary approach.  This would be a 
positive development, avoiding both the black hole theory’s resistance to the rule of law 
in counter-terrorism, and the full coverage theory’s insistence that existing law is 
adequate to the unforeseen challenges posed by terrorism. 
Evolution is not a radical break.  It is a development from within.  As 
international tribunals, councils, and monitoring bodies; national courts; and global civil 
society organizations have insisted, evolution from within must begin by respecting the 
principle that everyone has the right to recognition everywhere before the law. 
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